is not a defense. Murder is murder
.
Palestine: From Historical De-classing
To a Stand-by Regime 1
(Part One)
By Adel Samara
Analyzing class role and culture sheds significant light on the nature of the Palestinian struggle
on one hand, and clarifies why it ends to an impasse on the other. However, most writings on
Arab-Israeli conflict rarely deal with issues of class in general, structure and roles of Palestinian
social classes in particular.
This paper traces the class component in the Palestinian society and struggle without ignoring
other aspects. Its main emphasis is issues such as: Palestinian classes that supported the Oslo
Accords and those that did not, how does the Palestinian Authority rule in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, why was the PA a stand-by regime, what is the class origin of Hamas,
why did Hamas succeed to replace the PLO organizations, why western capitalist regimes, Arab
rulers, United Nations and Israel did not respect the ‘democracy’ that they insist on, and finally,
who represents the Palestinians.
* * *
Introductory Approach
Writings on the Arab-Israeli conflict rarely deal with the issue of class in general and the
structure and roles of Palestinian social classes in particular. Many writers approach this conflict
from an ethnic-religious perspective that maintains their loyalty to the brutal colonialism of the
U.S., Britain and France, while ignoring the core of the issue: "the role and interests of ruling
capitalist classes in Western Europe and North America", i.e accumulation. Even writers whose
analysis is based on the role of the world capitalist system, including the Arabs among them, do
not tackle the class issue in Palestine itself because they are mainly driven by the national aspect
of the conflict. The Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) also concentrates on the
national/political dimensions while avoiding the class content of the struggle. From the
1 A paper presented to a conference on “The Economy and the Economics of Palestine: Past, Present and Future”
sponsored by SOAS Palestine Society at the University of London 27-28 January 2007.
- 2 -
beginning this struggle was carried out by popular classes, albeit led by Effendis, petty bourgeois
and middle class figures.2 Few Palestinian intellectuals adopt the class analytical approach in
their writings. Even when Marxism was the “ideology” of the Palestinian left, these intellectuals
raised Marxist slogans, but were subjugated to bourgeois leadership in practice. This is why,
when the PLO leadership decided to sign the Oslo Accords that brought them back to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip (WBG), most of the leftist leaders and intellectuals failed to address the
class issue in general and to grasp the class content of those Accords. Today, many continue to
avoid this approach.
The aim of this paper is to trace the class component in Palestinian society and struggle without
ignoring other aspects. A reading from within the Palestinian struggle and with a deep analysis
cannot ignore its class component. If one were to write the people's history, and not only that of
the leaders, it is amply evident that while territorial, economic, class, cultural, and political
disintegration of Palestine affected all social classes in the first occupation in 1948 and the
second in 1967, those who were most deeply harmed, and at the same time exerted the most
resistance, were the popular classes. Even within the Palestinian society, which is immersed in a
deep national struggle, the class struggle persists. This is an issue which has been hidden. Since
1948 the upper classes in Palestine have been very tied to their own interests; these interests
were, in a way, opposed to the interests of the majority of the population. On the other hand, the
popular classes always fought for the national cause. This, in itself, is one form of class and
political exploitation, launched, albeit indirectly, by the bourgeoisie against the popular classes.
This may support a different theory on nationalism: that nationalism in each society, especially
those subjected to colonialism, whether in its traditional form or in new dependency modes, is
manifested in two contradictory commitments, and not only one, albeit hidden during national
liberation era,: the nationalism of the bourgeois class which is mainly compromise the national
cause and the nationalism of the popular classes which is for independence, development and
socialism. Other classes are always reluctant and divided between the two.
Class Conflict in the Final Era of the Ottoman Empire
Class struggle is not limited to ‘street fighting’ as it was in Paris Commune or in Lebanon’s civil
war in 1970s and 1980s. Internal class conflict in Palestine during Ottoman rule, was between
the upper social/political elite, ‘merchants’ and sheiks, and later between the educated of Ashraf
(aristocratic families) and their sons in the last years of Ottoman rule. Class struggle is always
present in class societies; it does not matter how it manifests itself. In colonies the dependent
classes fight for the trickle-down economic interests or political role. This struggle might also be
against the colonial power and for the interest of one class against another. Even today, how do
we understand and analyze the conflict between Fateh and Hamas? Is it beyond a conflict for
power within the same classes, though in a colony and under the false umbrella of a global
colonized democracy….so-called Palestinian elections.
The extraction of surplus by the tax collectors in Ottoman Palestine was the main factor
that contributed to the creation of a merchant class in rural areas. But the integration of Ottoman
Palestine into the World Order, and the concessions and privileges offered to the merchants,
strengthened their role at the cost of the sheiks. While the merchant class started in urban areas, it
2 There is a long, yet not solved, debate whether the middle class is an independent class, or even the pettybourgeois,
the weakest point in this class is that there is no such mode of production called the petty-bourgeois
mode of production.
- 3 -
extended its direct contraband trade from the colonies, i.e. Palestine, to Europe. The restoration
of the central power by Sultan Abdul Hamid during the last three decades of the 19th century put
an end to the sheiks' rule (who were the good tools for the Iltizam era), and put the educated
young sons of the Ashraf and merchant families who took their place. (Samara 1991:73)
The dependent classes are not always free to choose their allies. The dominant class and
the nation are those who decide. That is why, when the merchants became most necessary for the
Ottomans, they, i.e. the Ottomans, backed them to replace sheiks. Relatively speaking, this
competition for the trickle-down gains is a class struggle, even if it is between 'dependents'.
Other classes in the society were marginalized and remained passive in political terms, but they
were the focus of class struggle among the upper classes, which means that a class attack, class
exploitation, was imposed upon them. "This new era enabled the merchants to accumulate large
amounts of money but they failed to invest in the industrial sector" (Loutsky, 1980). Why? It is
because this class, while accumulated money liquidity, failed to transfer it into capital. This class
failed to transfer itself into an independent class. The absence of independent policies and culture
will never breed an independent modernized economy. The monetary liquidity that this class
accumulated was not a result of a productive activity, but instead was through its relationship
with the colonial power. So long as this class was not motivated by an independence mentality,
productive investment on a national scale will never be in its political program. It might be right
to say that a class dependent on a trickle-down economy will breed a trickle-down politics, i.e.
Self-Rule not independence (as was the case later with the PLO).
The era of British colonialism in Palestine (1917-1945) was not different. The creation of
a foreign state in Palestine, a state designed to be a base performing a specific “function”, was
necessary for the British colonial empire, regardless whether it was Jewish or not. It should be
noted that, Jews were never able to settle in Palestine without being brought, protected, trained,
financed and armed by British colonizers. In that period, Palestinian peasants and workers
suffered from the settlers, that is why they started national resistance through strikes and
upheavals (known as Intifada throughout the ‘British Mandate’ in Palestine). At the same time
merchants, big land owners and effendis were looking for employment for their educated sons in
the Mandate government. The upper class factions were consumed by the idea that British
colonialism would find a ‘just solution’ for the conflict in Palestine. Committed to its colonial
project, i.e. the creation of a Jewish agent state in Palestine, the British colonizers were
extracting surplus from Palestinian peasants; they bankrupted the national economy in order to
build the infrastructure of the Jewish colonial settlements.
"In fact, the Palestinian economy (which was mainly agricultural) was heavily taxed, and
the extracted surplus was transformed to the Jewish capitalist economy" (Asad, 1975) (Hodgkin,
1986). However, big landowners, Palestinian and Lebanese, sold the Arab land to Jewish settlers.
The mercantile mentality of the Palestinian bourgeois class did not change during the
British mandate. Its economic activities continued on both the merchant and usury levels. Its
accumulated surplus was transferred to the British banks in Great Britain as liquid assets, leaving
the country without any significant productive investments despite the existence of several local
opportunities for profits making and accumulation of capital.
It was not until the years of World War II that the Palestinian Arab economy experienced
a dramatic commercialization of agriculture and a semi-industrial production base devoted to
satisfying the needs of British colonial troops. This development was due to the desperate need
of the British colonial military forces in the Middle East for a readily available food supply to
meet the shortages that resulted from the Axis' sea blockade of the allied navies in the
Mediterranean Sea.
- 4 -
Therefore, while the Jewish settlers were strengthening the productive base for their
capitalist economy, the Palestinian bourgeois class was transferring the surplus of their country's
traditional economy abroad. "Figures on Arab deposits in October 1945 show that they rose from
a total of 532,515 Sterling Pounds at the end of 1941 to just 7 million by the end of October
1945. (The magnitude of such a sum can be gauged by the fact that this 7 million Sterling Pound
amounted to almost 1 million more that the entire civilian budget of the government of Palestine
in the fiscal year 1944/45" (Smith, 1984:118). The accelerated money transfer shows that fast
profiteering was matched by the fast transfer of money abroad.
The money may have fled the country for any one or all of the following reasons: the
threat presented by the British planted Jewish settlers and their potential occupation of the
country; Palestinians were not encouraged by the British occupation to invest in local needs and,
lastly, because the Palestinian merchant bourgeois' culture wasn't a national - productive one.
Whatever might be the real reason or interpretation, the deduced lesson is that the rich class, the
merchants, did not prioritize either their struggle or their productive activity.
Following the defeat of the Palestinian resistance and the Arab armies in the 1948 war,
Palestine as a country was totally disintegrated in terms of space, society, economy and even as a
national movement. Nearly one million Palestinians were evicted after that defeat and scattered
all over the world. Many of the rich faction (merchants, aristocracy, manufacturers and the
educated) found their way either to Britain or the United States while most of the educated and
professionals immigrated to various Arab capitals to work there and develop into a contract
financial capitalist faction.3 The petty bourgeoisie found its shelter inside and around the cities in
the West Bank and Jordan, while the majority, the poor, were piled in refugee camps.
Palestinian merchants and aristocracy4, especially those with the World Bank, established
a class alliance with the Jordanian ruling class, and both maintained a strong relationship with
British colonialism despite its major role in creating Israel. This alliance was reflected in two
sources of privileges for the Palestinian bourgeoisie: benefits derived from its share in the
political power and benefits from employing the poor refugees who earned low wages.
The reason why Palestinian big landowners invested in agriculture in the Jordan Valley
was the concentration of a large refugee labor force in that area.5 That is why, "… a substantial
part of the Sterling Pound 10 million in Sterling balances held by Palestinians in London at the
end of the Second World War was invested in agricultural development in the West Bank and the
Jordan Valley after the 1948 war as well as in urban real estate in Amman and other East Bank
cities. Other funds became available in 1953 when Israel released part of the deposits held by
Palestinians in Arab banks which came under Israeli rule 1948" (Gabbay, 1959:451). Another
important source of capital arose when the government of Jordan established an agricultural
mortgage program in 1950. By the end of 1954 it had granted a total of more than three million
Jordanian Dinars (JD) in loans mainly to those large land owners who supported the monarch.
"In fact that the JD 3 million granted in mortgage during this five-year period went to less
than four hundred borrowers indicates the extent to which the mortgage schema concentrated
capital for agricultural development in the hands of the large landowners."(Smith, 1984)
3 The same faction returned after Oslo to dominate the Palestinian economy through privileges.
4 In December 1948, Sheikh Mohammad Ali al-Ja'bari of Hebron convened a meeting of West Bank notables on
behalf of the Arab congress. They called King Abdullah of Jordan to unite both banks under his rule.
5 Large number of Palestinian refugees was concentrated in the Jordan valley following 1948 eviction of the
Palestinians. There was a settlement plan for the refugees there. A pilot project established there, the Arab
Development Project led by Musa Al-A'alami. The plan failed because the refugees made an Intifada in the refugee
camps in the area, and the police killed 17 protestors.
- 5 -
Accordingly, Palestinian capitalism established a new alliance according to the new
changes, i.e. from Britain to the Jordanian regime, motivated by its own interests while leaving
struggle for the liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian Right of Return (ROR) to the popular
classes. That is why it is understandable that this bourgeoisie maintained its loyalty to the ruling
class in Jordan, (which, in turn, maintained its alliance with British colonialism)6, separating
themselves from Jordanian national movement against the regime.
Moreover, Palestinian capitalism maintained its loyalty to the Jordanian regime even after
the 1967 occupation and during Jordan's and the PLO's competition over the representation of
the Palestinian people, a loyalty which proved that Palestinians were divided on a class basis
despite their eviction from Palestine as a people and their collective fate as refugees. The popular
classes supported the PLO and, in fact, they were its backbone. In Gaza Strip, the Nasserite
regime of Egypt provided the merchants and aristocracy with a window for smuggling and
making a living in a poor, tiny and crowded area. The position of the popular classes was the
same: they were the backbone of the national struggle.
Palestinians of al-shatat7 and Resistance
The Capitalist Class
Following the destruction of the Palestinian space in 1948, all social classes became
fragmented, escaped the Zionist massacres, and looked for a temporary space waiting for the
final return, a goal which is still not accomplished.
Place and status determined the role of each class in the shatat. The popular and middle
classes were integrated into the parties of the Arab national movement, and later, after the 1967
war and the occupation of the rest of Palestine, when the Palestinian Resistance Movement
(PRM) was mainly an armed struggle, the youth of the popular classes became its backbone.
Those in oil producing countries and some in the America's and Europe paid (daribat althawrah)
"revolution tax" to the PRM leadership, a tax which was agreed upon by the ruling
classes in the oil countries, but was totally orientated to the right wing of the PRM. This
deliberately channeled money was never an ‘innocent’ matter. It was directed to de-radicalize the
PRM through two means:
- Arab oil producing regimes were deliberately strengthening the right wing against the
left which was at that time 1967-1970 competes the right wing.
- By corrupting the PRM as a policy aimed at terminating and capitalizing it. (This is one
of the early trials to transform PLO leadership into bureaucratic capitalism).
Palestinian shatat capitalists maintained a “wait and see” relationship with the PLO.
Following the eviction of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian shatat capitalists held a
conference in London on June 24, 1982 in preparation for inheriting the PLO. The theme of this
6 A movement of Jordanians and Palestinians whose main parties were the Ba'ath, the Communist, al-Qawmiyoun
a-Sourioun, and Arab Nationalist Movement parties. Most of the members of this movement were from the popular
classes.
7 Shatat is an Arabic term that signifies one's living outside of his/her homeland. In the context of this paper, shatat
is used to indicate Palestinians who were forcefully expelled from their homeland – Palestine as a result of the
Zionist occupation of Palestine in 1948 and the years that followed. These Palestinians reside, since 1948, in many
Arab and other countries world-wide as Palestinian refugees.
- 6 -
summit may be defined as follows: "Since PLO lost its military role, then it is time of the
capitalists to lead".8
Following the London conference, Arafat opened the channel of communications for
those people who, soon after, froze their initiative; this was probably because they realized that
Israel was not ready to withdrew from parts of the occupied territories or that Israel recognized
their weakness, and if she were to negotiate, Israel would rather negotiate with those who have
popular support, i.e. PLO. Briefly, the role of Palestinian capitalists in the national conflict is
through negotiation, not struggle, and the Homeland for them wasn't a dunam of land in Jafa, but
their bank account. As a people of capital, the Homeland is a business. That is why, when PLO
started negotiations with Israel that Palestinian elite supported and became closer to Arafat and
his bureaucratic capitalist structure. Even inside the occupied territories that large section of
capitalists became sub-contractors and essentially formed a Palestinian comprador.
The Popular Classes
While most of the rich and intellectual Palestinian refugees migrated to far areas, i.e.
Arab Oil producing countries, Britain and the US, the popular classes remained and ‘settled’ as
close as possible to the occupied Homeland, i.e. in the WBG, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria…etc9.
It is clear that they, the popular classes, insisted on returning to their homeland, and, at the same
time, that their financial situation could not help them to go further. They were concentrated in
the refugee camps to create a different community: a very poor people, who were integrated into
the wage earners of most of the host countries, but maintained a special status different from that
of the social classes of the countries they lived in. The situation in Jordan was the exception. The
politically active Palestinians integrated into the Jordanian national movement which, in fact,
considers the Palestinian question on the top of its agenda.
Briefly, the Palestinians of the shatat integrated into the economies of the host countries,
but politically, they remained divided on a class basis. The rich people supported the moderate
policies of the ruling Arab classes, while the popular classes integrated into the national, Political
Islam (PI) and socialist Arab movements. The defeat of the Arab nationalist and ‘socialist’
regimes led to the defeat of the Arab nationalist and socialist movement in the 1967 war.
The Second Occupation 1967:
Mechanisms of National Struggle and Class Integration
There is no consensus among Palestinians whether Israel had, prior to the occupation in
1967, prepared any plans as to how to control the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).10 The
8 In fact, this is similar to what has been said by Hikmat al-Masri in 1978 who stated:
"If the PLO returns to the West Bank through liberation, it is all right. But if PLO will returns through negotiations,
it is we who are the proper people for that".
9 It should be noted that all projects to re-settle Palestinian refugees were designed to settle them far from the
borders of Palestine.
10 As a citizen living all my life in the area, I never agreed with such ready made policy. I spent my life in the
resistance movement, but I never dreamt that we will defeat Israel fast as Palestinians without an Arab national
liberation movement, but I never gave up the continuity of resistance since I believe that as long as people resist,
then the victory is possible.
- 7 -
Israeli occupation designed its policies in the occupied territories step by step and according to
developments on the international level as well.11
As for the class integration among Palestinians, the occupation gave this issue serious
consideration and early on aimed to avoid people's resistance. At the official level, two Israeli
ministers provided their government with their proposals on the issue. Moshe Dayan, the Israeli
minister of war, suggested that Israel should terminate the infrastructure of the occupied
territories so as to keep the Palestinian labor force and the entire society dependent on the Israeli
economy, i.e. permanent integration without annexation, thus keeping Israel as a pure Jewish
state. Pinhas Sapir, the Minister of Finance, suggested, on the other hand, to keep the economy
of the occupied territories as it is, and to build a free trade relationship between the two
economies, the Israeli and that of the occupied territories. The Israeli government adopted
Dayan’s proposal which was a true settler-colonial one that included ethnic cleansing of the
native people and confiscation of their land. This entailed forcing Palestinians, as much as
possible, to leave not through direct eviction, but by creating all sorts of obstacles and harsh
living conditions. This destroyed and uprooted the Palestinian culture of steadfastness so they
eventually left without being able to claim or prove that Israel was transferring them, i.e. a soft
transfer.
Israeli economic integration of the occupied territories started in the early days of the
1967 occupation. The occupied territories were denoted as a military zone at the advent of the
occupation in June 1967 and since then Israel has issued well over 2000 military orders and
regulations, covering all aspects of life. Israel outlawed existing export-import relations (orders
No. 10-12) in the occupied territories during the first few months of the occupation. Since then
local merchants started marketing Israeli goods or goods imported through Israel. Thus,
merchants can be seen as the first social class to become linked to the Israeli economy, i.e.
normalizing with the enemy motivated by class interests at the cost of national cause. Some of
these merchants imported raw materials from Israel (such as wood, metal and cement) for the
supply of local factories. The result was the dependency of local manufacturers on Israel. In this
way manufacturers became the second class to be linked to the Israeli economy. Until that time,
boycotting Israeli products wasn't at stake; only a few intellectuals were doing it on individual
basis but then boycotting failed as a political/national slogan because they believed that the
community would not practice it.
In the mid 1960s, Israel started to transform its industries toward specialization in
electronics and sophisticated military industries so as to accommodate with the world division of
labor that pushed developed countries towards technological specialization. This was the reason
Israel decreased its emphasis on many of its traditional industries such as textiles, footwear and
chemicals. The occupied territories faced a process of re-allocation of industries to their
detriment. While Israel concentrated on industries with a future, the occupied territories were left
with branches of production of lower technological level and with fewer prospects of growth, a
situation which perpetuated the economic gap between them. Much of the re-allocation took the
form of transferring textile production to the occupied territories. These textile workshops were
the beginnings of the sub-contract industries, which "cemented" the dependency of a subcontracting
(see later) and comprador class in the occupied territories on the economy of Israeli
occupation. As for the working class, despite the 150-200 thousand strong wave of emigration in
the wake of the 1967 war, the unemployment rate actually increased. The reason for this was a
11 For instance, until 1980s it was possible for any villager to build a home in any place of his land. Following that,
the occupation designed maps to extremely limit the borders of each populated area. But PLO never understands
this issue.
- 8 -
sharp decline in the demand for labor in the occupied territories. As a result, the Palestinian
workers were faced with the choice of emigrating or working in Israel. The first step in the latter
case was work for Israeli contractors inside the occupied territories themselves as Israel started to
expand the road network. Israeli appointed local foremen, in turn, recruited local Palestinian
workers. The expansion of road networks might have been primarily due to Israeli security
reasons and to enable military forces to quickly reach the remote areas which might serve as
secure areas for guerilla fighters.
Ten thousand Palestinian workers were per diem workers for road construction. This
marked the beginning of the creation of a stratum of sub-contractors and mediators who stand as
buffer zone between the Israeli entrepreneurs and capitalists on the one hand and a labor force
from the occupied territories on the other. The number of workers increased rapidly to reach one
third of the occupied territories labor force in the mid 1970s. Even before the large scale
expropriations of land, Palestinian workers came primarily not from cities but from rural areas
and refugee camps that served as a pool for surplus labor force.
To orientate peasants towards dependency on the Israeli economy, Israeli authorities
started a policy called al-mushahada; Israeli bonuses were paid to farmers planting certain crops
which Israel required to satisfy its exports, and flood the markets of the occupied territories with
cheap products, thus competing with those products that were locally produced.
The peasant family was compelled to increase income by sending its members to seek
employment in cities of the occupied territories, oil producing Arab countries, and even in Israel.
As a result, the entire society of the occupied territories, consumers and producers began to
depend on the Israeli economy. This was not voluntary dependence, (with the exception of the
traders and compradors) since it was shaped and formed by the policy of the Israeli state. The
political factor, the role of the Israeli state, worked relatively autonomously in the
peripheralization of the occupied territories. Nevertheless, the economic factor was, and still
remains, the determining one, crystallized in land expropriation, collecting taxes, economic
integration, rapid increase in prices, employment of cheap labor and the accumulation of profits
through unequal exchange and the obstruction of the occupied territories internal accumulation
process.
There are three local classes or class factions that played the role of deepening
dependency, which ultimately made the occupied territories a periphery to the Israeli center:
• The merchant capitalists (city merchants) who existed since the period of the
Jordanian rule and had extensively exploited local farmers.
• The large agricultural landowners who oriented their production to or through
Israel to foreign centers.
• The new comprador capitalists who were created directly and intentionally by the
occupation authorities, and included remnants of the same faction that existed
since the Jordanian and Egyptian rule. The change that took place here was in
terms of individuals not of the stratum.
These three strata provided a good example of the structural dependence (economic, social,
political and cultural) of a peripheral colonized capitalism.
The Israelis captured and dominated the markets of the occupied territories, i.e. 90
percent of imports to the occupied territories and 50 percent of its exports are from Israel; one
third of the labor force of the occupied territories works in Israel. The combination of these facts
illustrates how these three strata quickly prospered. This reminds me of what Meron Benvenisti
noted in relation to the occupied territories, under occupation there is an individual prosperity
- 9 -
and mass poverty. It seems that Benvenisti grasped the surface of the issue not its deep currents.
That is why he failed to grasp the fact that fat-cats are not only individuals.
These new wealthy people rarely contributed to the development of the local economy, or
even in the expansion of the domestic market. Their trickle-down share of the surplus, while it is
modest in comparison to that of the share of the settler-colonialists, would have been adequate to
activate the local market and provide a basis for internal demand if they did not channel their
demand towards luxurious goods, which were already available in the Israeli market. Moreover,
these strata continued draining the surplus by shifting it abroad as a continuity of the same class
behavior prior to 1948, when Palestine was one social formation.
We might assume that the most clear class structure of Palestinian people was in the West
Bank/Gaza (WBG). But this structure wasn't an obvious one, i.e. we can not say that there was a
real capitalist class in terms of values, industrialization, and traditions of liberalism. Nor can we
say that there was a capitalist class in terms of investment in industry. This class is still relatively
close to the merchant class with a comprador mentality; and although it is not rich in comparison
to the same class in the capitalist center, there are real boundaries that divide it from the popular
classes especially the refugees.
After the 1967 war, Palestinian capitalism faced the challenge of political/class identity.
Should it donate its loyalty and alliance to the resistance movement, the PLO, or should it
maintain its loyalty and alliance with the Jordanian ruling class. Or, should it compromise with
the national enemy, the Israeli occupation.
While this class continuously demonstrated its Palestinian identity and character, it never
cut off its connection to other involved parties. This class is a part of the social fabric of OPT,
occupied Palestinian territories, but at the same time it is those 'Palestinian individuals' who
prospered during the occupation, to use Meron Benvenisti's description for this class. The
striking example of this class is the sub-contract faction which started in early 1968. In fact, the
only faction that was harmed by the occupation is the productive one. But this is not the main
faction of this class, and it is hard to investigate if this faction is really, only, or purely
productive. Many who were well known as industrialists are, in fact, agents for foreign products
from the same sector of their own products.12
The compromise attitude of this class towards the occupation stems from the fact that, as
non-productive capitalism, it lacks the motivation of monopolizing and protecting its own
national market. The fact that the Homeland itself, and not only the market, is occupied and
colonized, made this class more inclined towards making compromise, a compromise which was
crystallized in compradoric economic and political roles.
The same goes for its relationship with Jordanian regime. Through the policy of Open
Bridges, Israel maintained a relationship of mutual interests between the local capitalists and
Jordan as an alternative to the PLO. The Jordanian regime would maintain access to agricultural
products from Jordan Valley, which belongs to the same rich landowners who benefited from
Jordanian loans following the 1948 war.
As for the popular classes, they were the first that continuously declared their support for
the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. These classes constituted the social
base of the PLO inside oPt, the occupied Palestinian territories, while the refugee camps were
12 In an interview with pharmacies they showed me products imported by local industrialists who imported them 6
months before their expiration date, and they are the only who have licenses to import them. During the first
Intifada I, myself, saw Israeli trucks empty their loads in stores of local factories as their ready-made products.
What the locals did was to stick the labels of the names of their factories on the
- 10 -
that base in the shatat. The support of the popular classes for the PLO was always exploited by
the PLO's leadership, i.e. a leadership that was mainly composed of the petty-bourgeoisie, but
included some middle class people, and little elite of the bourgeoisie. Throughout the entire long
march of the PLO leadership, it was clearly supported by the popular classes, but it was working,
even as a liberation movement, for the interests of the middle and upper classes.13 The Oslo
Accords were an obvious example of that "peace for capital".14 The middle class leadership of
the Palestinian labor movement, which was mainly from the Communist party, and later from
other leftist organizations, is to be blamed for deforming the class consciousness of the popular
classes under the pretense of a patriotic position in the national struggle of the upper classes.
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13 The experience of the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee, 1978-1985 is a striking example since its loans,
finally transferred to donations, were limited to the businessmen, landowners, but none offered to the popular
classes.
14 Peace for Capital: Several peace agreements have been signed between some Arab regimes, especially the PLO
leadership (later the Palestinian Authority), and Israel. The experience shows that this peace has, indeed, taken
place among the capitalist classes in the western capitalist center, especially USA and Europe, the Israeli capitalist
ruling class, and the Arab capitalist regimes in the periphery. The main goal of this peace was to maintain and
accelerate the capitalist slogan: “The liberalization of trade on the World scale”. The experience in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip (WBG) also shows that those who benefited from this peace were the capitalist hierarchy starting
from its center in the USA to the comprador capitalists in the WBG. Briefly, this peace did not serve or save the
lives of the Palestinians in the WBG. That is why it is a peace for capital, not for people.
Palestine: From Historical De-classing
To a Stand-by Regime [1]
(Part Two)
By Adel Samara
A Note from Kana’an:
Analyzing class role and culture sheds significant light on the nature of the Palestinian struggle on one hand, and clarifies why it ends to an impasse on the other. However, most writings on Arab-Israeli conflict rarely deal with issues of class in general, structure and roles of Palestinian social classes in particular.
This paper traces the class component in the Palestinian society and struggle without ignoring other aspects. Its main emphasis is issues such as: Palestinian classes that supported the Oslo Accords and those that did not, how does the Palestinian Authority rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, why was the PA a stand-by regime, what is the class origin of Hamas, why did Hamas succeed to replace the PLO organizations, why western capitalist regimes, Arab rulers, United Nations and Israel did not respect the ‘democracy’ that they insist on, and finally, who represents the Palestinians.
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Oslo Peace for Capital
When the PLO was created it was supposed to be a leading and representative body for all Palestinians. As a liberation movement, the PLO exhibited relative harmony between its form and content, while in essence it was led and monopolized by the petty- bourgeoisie and its organic intellectual elite who was hesitating between national struggle and class interests and the ambitions for higher social status. This contradiction does not appear during the era of military struggle, 1967-1994.[2] By signing the Oslo Accords (Oslo), the PLO leadership introduced a drastic change in Palestinian politics. As a “peace for capital” process, the Oslo Accords served most of the segments of Palestinian capitalist classes, at the cost of the historical rights of the rest of the people. The PLO changed from the ‘mother of all’ to be the ‘tool of the few’.
Once the PLO leadership signed Oslo Accords, it, in fact, fell into the trap of ‘splitting’ its homeland with the settler colonial entity whose lust for land confiscation was limitless. This opens the discussion about the PLO national commitment, i.e. what motivated this leadership, was it a national commitment or its material class interests (economy, power, culture…etc)?
The Oslo Accords confirmed the subjugation of the Palestinian bbourgeoisie to the enemy's conditions. The Palestinian economy continues to be dependent upon and integrated into the Israeli economy. Every economic activity in the WBG is designed to be a client of its counterpart in Israel. For instance, every bank that operates in the Palestinian Authority (PA) areas must be represented by an Israeli bank in a clearinghouse. Telecommunications in the WBG are subsidiaries of the Israeli monopoly Bezek. WBG water and electric companies are dependent on Israeli water and electricity companies. The same goes for the customs system.[3] The Palestinian tax authority is connected with the Israeli system, which explains why their computer system closes on Saturdays.[4] The PA has no authority over its population; its movement in and out of the territory is controlled by Israel. Israeli authorities are the only ones allowed to register births and deaths. No Palestinian is able to leave or return without an Israeli permit, no export/import activity is possible without Israeli control. The territories of the WBG are divided into three categories: A, B and C. Area A, which includes territories that are dense in population, cities and some towns, is under a civil Palestinian rule, but the Israeli army enters these areas freely. Area B, which is mainly villages, is under direct Israeli security control, but some civil activities are donated to the PA. The most important is area C, which contains most of territories of the WBG, and is under absolute Israeli control.[5] That explains why Israeli settlements continued to swell up after the Oslo Accords. The powers delegated to the PA are to collect taxes, receive donors’ funds, trickle-down economy and opportunities for corruption.
An in-depth discussion of the terms and conditions of the Oslo Accords is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the issue here is what social class those Accords were designed to serve? The nature of the social classes that supported the Oslo Accords might shed some light on the nature of the Accords themselves.
Who Supported the Oslo Accords?
The social classes that supported the Oslo Accords were the PLO leadership, the Palestinian capitalist class inside the Occupied Palestinian territory and Palestinian financial capitalists. The PLO leadership became capitalists through controlling the flow of money from various Arab regimes into its accounts; the taxes collected as contributions from Palestinians working in Arab oil producing countries and the contributions and donations from Palestinians in shatat.
This leadership transformed into a bureaucratic capitalist class that did business in Lebanon and many African countries while at the same time it looked for a safe haven for its own interests to practice power albeit under the rude supervision of foreign occupation. As a right wing, middle class and petty bourgeois social class, it was a natural development for this class to develop into a bureaucratic capitalist class and adopt the market economy.[6]
The Palestinian capitalist class inside occupied Palestinian territory is mainly composed of subcontractors, commercial and comprador capitalists, all of whom are integrated within and dependant upon Israeli capital.
The Palestinian financial capitalists in the shatat are more integrated within international financial capital. Most of this segment of Palestinian capitalism was composed of contractors in the Arab Gulf countries.
These capitalist factions were backed theoretically and politically by three groups of capitalist organic intellectuals.
The Palestinian liberal westernized intellectual elite, academics, NGOs cadres and the intellectual compradors, who did not practice military struggle, and argued against those who conducted it.[7] In fact, these intellectuals normalized relations with the Israelis from the early years of the Israeli occupation.
A second group of intellectuals who supported the capitalist factions were renegade leftist intellectuals opposed to or neutral towards military struggle and the liberation of Palestine. They were always in favor of recognizing Israel and attacked Arab nationalism and imperialism from a communist point view. Later they remained against Arab nationalism, but became neo-liberals!
And finally, the capitalist factions were also supported by ex-militant intellectuals who had always justified the policies of the PLO leadership and returned with it to the West Bank/Gaza through the Oslo Accords. This group is the most dangerous because of its long dependency on the PLO leadership. They justified the leadership's signing of the Oslo Accords, came back with it, NGO-ized, and normalized with the Zionist Entity (ZE).
Many intellectuals from within these three groups became directors of NGOs, supporters of the World Bank prescriptions, and crystallized in a group of ‘invisible income’. The issue here is that, they are really organic intellectuals for the capitalist class. As long as this class compradorized, they follow and justify that deformity. Both of them pull the country to the same problem. They are selective intellectuals, once analyzing from a Marxist point view, and another time from a liberal point view and normalizing with the Zionist Entity!
The PLO acceptance of Palestinian Self-Rule (SR) in parts of the West Bank and Gaza, demonstrates the fact that this is the first political entity in modern history to exchange sovereignty for trickle-down economy. It is the first entity that meets the criteria of globalization in terms of complete surrender of sovereignty, and since the creation of the World Bank, it is the first to adhere to its prescriptions as well as to create a secret Chairman’s budget parallel to the national one.[8]
In 1967 Israel proposed 'self-rule' for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This project suggested that Israel would be responsible for security in the Occupied Territories, and Jordan would have the responsibility for matters of law enforcement. Water resources came under joint administration.[9] When one compares what Israel offered to the Jordanian regime in 1967 with those of the Oslo Accords, then the PLO acceptance of the latter becomes clearly shocking.
Oslo does not mention joint responsibility for water and it accepts Israeli control of most of rural areas. But, why did the PLO leadership accept all this subjugation?
As noted earlier, it is the exchange of the Homeland for a business project. It is “peace for capital”, especially when the capitalist class dominates politics, and when there is no opposition. But how?
More Reasons to Accept Oslo?
All of the aforementioned Palestinian capitalist classes and factions accepted Oslo despite the fact that it never contained an Israeli withdrawal or land liberation, and it did not breed an independent Palestinian state in the 1967 occupied areas. Was it, then, autonomy? They sacrificed the liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian right of return (ROR), and even the independence of the West Bank/Gaza, but what did they receive in exchange?
This concentrated the issue of class interests and, for the capitalists; these interests took priority over the national cause. In the early 1970s the PLO leadership realized their inability to liberate Palestine. A detailed examination of why the PLO leadership welcomed “peace missionaries” and gave up its militant role is beyond the scope of this article but a few significant factors should be noted.
The social classes and factions, who supported Oslo, were accustomed to conducting businesses without being in an independent state. some of them actually developed outside of the homeland and, except few individuals, they were capitalists who never participated in political struggle, not to mention military struggle. As a petty bourgeois (commercial) and intellectual middle class, the PLO leadership learned how to conduct business in shatat, so why not do business with the enemy? They have long comprador experience with Arab ruling classes and business experience in the pre-Oslo era. They turned the PLO into a political and financial mixture of business/State/NGO’s. This became obvious after Oslo, when the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership received billions of dollars and used them as if it was their own money.
Through business experience, the PLO leadership slowed down military struggle. But the turning point was the eviction from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, as the PLO leadership realized that an independent state is not an imperative condition to conduct business and accumulate profit, especially as long as the price of independence is too much. Accordingly, they decided to be satisfied by the trickle –down economy and politics, i.e. the self-rule.
The structure of th
