In my previous piece on Arab secularism, both overt and veiled, I promised to consider ways of advancing progressive secularism in the Arab world.
The question of bringing the Arab and Muslim worlds into the "modern age" has occupied some of the greatest minds of the past two centuries. It has been approached by natives of the region and foreigners, by friends and foes, by those with an honest desire for reform and those with their own agenda.
Some may question why Arab and Muslim societies need to secularise, while others will argue it is a doomed project because Islam and secularism are apparently incompatible beasts.
Well, it is my conviction that secularism is the bedrock of enlightenment because it confines religion to the individual spiritual sphere where it belongs, and leaves the ever-shifting reality of worldly affairs to human resourcefulness. The compelling proof of this is that Europe and the west's success has been largely secular, as was the Muslim world's before that, by the standards of the time. So, what can be done to speed up the train of secularisation and modernisation?
The Guardian's Brian Whitaker explores this question thoroughly in his new book – which I was interviewed for and had the pleasure of reading and commenting on in pre-publication – and in a series of articles for Comment is free.
"The Middle East will only be convinced by Islamic arguments for a secular state," he argues. "Secularists have to be prepared to engage with religious arguments – something they are often reluctant to do."
Since enduring reform comes from within and is usually gradual and incremental; this has also been my position. In self-defined "Islamic" states, especially those with a vibrant political landscape and nascent democratic institutions, such as Iran, this can empower reformers. While in Arab and Muslim states which are already secular, Islamic arguments for secularism can help steal the thunder of the Islamists and neutralise them intellectually.
This also broadly corresponds with what generations of Muslim reformers have attempted, beginning with the "Islamic modernists". The founder of that movement, Muhammad Abdu, sought to "liberate thought from the shackles of imitation/tradition [taqlid]" and to prove that "religion must be accounted a friend to science". Abdu lamented the closing of the gates of "ijtihad" and that through this manner of reasoned (re)interpretation Islamic morality and law could be adapted to suit the modern world.
However, placing secularism in an Islamic shell is not enough. It needs to regain its credibility by delivering concrete results. Many Arab and Muslim societies seem to be caught between the rock of repressive regimes, often with western backing, and the hard place of the Islamists, who are likely to take authoritarianism to a new level if they gain power.
Secular opposition needs to find a way of offering a viable alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Islamists in the eyes of the disenchanted. There are early signs of this occurring in places like Egypt where secularists have been regrouping in recent years.
As Whitaker points out in his book, one of the key appeals of the Muslim Brotherhood is not so much their religious identity but their promise – whether honest or not – to stamp out corruption and restore the rule of law. To highlight that Islamism is not the only show in town, secularists need to demonstrate that their efforts to promote democratic freedom and limit the political powers of leaders is driven by a desire to protect the dignity and rights of the individual.
Dressing secularism up in Islamic garments is a useful stepping stone, but will eventually come up against the brick wall of what I term the "God veto" on issues where religious and cultural beliefs are too strong to be reasoned with effectively. A good example of this is the status of women.
In Egypt, for example, although the legal, social and economic status of women has improved significantly over the past century, efforts to create true equality are often derailed or watered down, as occurred during the revamping of the country's personal status laws, by an unholy alliance between religious and conservative circles.
There are also limitations on the ideological plane. Muhammad Abdu's back to fundamentals "salafiyya" was interpreted by secular reformers as an opportunity to jettison Islam's historical baggage and create a new, modern future-oriented society. However, by the likes of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was interpreted as an invitation to re-create the "glorious" past of the "pious ancestors".
To overcome this kind of inertia requires a society not to seek guidance from the past but from the future, and this requires the culture to shift away from the tendency to "emulate" – whether the Islamic past or the western present – and move towards "innovation", a challenge many ancient societies in decline have faced in the modern age.
Contemporary western societies possess both the confidence and resources to future-orient their perspectives. I don't believe it is an accident that the west's "golden age" has coincided with its domination of the global trading system, and the Middle East's terminal decline coincided with the loss of its monopoly on east-west trade.
Today, the pursuit of knowledge and development is such a resource intensive undertaking that, what had been in the mid-18th century a relatively small qualitative gap, has widened to almost unbridgeable proportions. Most Arab and Muslim societies, as well as many other developing countries, are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, domestic and global inequality, ignorance, and systematic disadvantage in the global balance of economic and political power.
To overcome this requires reform in every sphere, from decent education to political freedom, not to mention efforts to promote equality not just between individuals within a society, but between countries in the global trading and political system.
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SOURCE Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
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Ahmad Suaedy , Jakarta
In his book Islam in Indonesia in the Twenty-First Century (2008), Fred R. Von der Mehden argues that Indonesia has a Muslim majority and is democratic, although time is needed before this democracy stabilizes.
However, it is more than enough to confirm that Islam and democracy are compatible.
Quick count estimates on the 2009 elections indicate that Islamist political parties (those parties promoting an Islamic ideology, and nationalist Islamic parties whose support comes largely from the Muslim community) experienced a significant decrease in the votes they were able to secure at a legislative level.
In the 1999 election, Islamist parties - comprising the United Development Party (PPP) 10.71 percent, the Crescent Star Party (PBB) 1.94 percent, and the Justice Party (PK) 1.36 percent - obtained a total of around 14 percent of the vote. And combined with the Nationalist Islamic parties - the National Awakening Party (PKB) 12.61 percent and National Mandate Party (PAN) 7.12 percent - these Islamic parties secured 35 percent of the vote.
In the 2004 election, Islamist parties - comprising PKS (PK had to change its name to PKS because it failed to get the minimum threshold in the 1999 elections) 7.34 percent and PPP 8.15 percent - won a total of 16 percent of the vote. The nationalist Islamic parties, PKB and PAN, won 10.57 percent and 6.44 percent, respectively. All together, they secured 33 percent.
According to quick count estimates on the 2009 election, PPP and PKS have secured 5.45 percent and 8.46 percent, respectively (a total of 14 percent). Meanwhile, nationalist Islamic parties PKB and PAN are estimated to have won 5.12 percent and 6.36 percent. In total, they have only won 25.5 percent.
Thus the overall percentage of votes secured by Islamist parties and nationalist Islamic parties has decreased, even more so when compared to the 1955 election in which they obtained about 44 percent.
PKS has indeed gained a slightly larger percentage of votes compared to the 2004 election, but this can be seen as a cannibalization of votes from other Islamic parties, and not from nationalist parties. PKS is currently offering a pluralist orientation to voters, although this still features Islam as an ideology.
Taking into account the 2.5 percent parliament threshold, there are now five nationalist parties, three of whom won significant votes, namely the Democratic Party (PD) 20.33 percent, the Golkar Party 14.43 percent, and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) 14.31 percent.
The People's Conscience Party (Hanura) 4.42 percent, and the Great Indonesian Movement Party (Gerindra) 3.5 percent are two newcomers.
In this sense, the reality in Indonesia confirms Mehden's argument. Nationalist Islamic parties and those promoting an Islamic ideology are slowly sliding into obscurity, even though parties based on religious idealism are not always incompatible with democracy.
Parties maintaining an Islamic ideology can continue to exist as idealist parties advocating universal religious values and may evolve into universal parties, as was the case with the Democratic Christian Party that is currently in power in Germany.
In so far as it concerns the party system, exclusive Islamic ideologies are no longer able to meet the needs of those concerned about the existence of such Islamic parties or of those who still place hopes in the promise that ideological realization can change Indonesian state foundations.
However, in terms of their main actors and constituents, all parties in parliament are based on Islam, differing only in orientation and program priorities. Democracy, it seems, has given Indonesians the power to determine the orientation and future of Indonesia.
This is not to say all is well. Poverty, a lack of education, the potential for conflicts, and tendencies of intolerance and tyranny of certain understandings over others are still significant issues. Mehden proposes at least three agendas for Indonesia in the future.
The first is to maintain pluralism. In the past, the Indonesian reality and descriptions of Islam in Indonesia showed Indonesia as a flexible and tolerant nation.
However, recently conflicts have broken out in several places including Ambon, Poso and West Kalimantan, and there is tension and more minor outbreaks of violence elsewhere, and also Sharia bylaws which are constraint to democracy. Resolving conflicts and tension must be a priority.
Resolution must not be achieved purely through political authoritarianism, but through the construction of a political and social system based on original Indonesian culture.
Second, is to maintain democracy itself. There are three points to this.
First, Islamic-based parties are required to emerge and create a dynamic non-monolithic Islamic society in order to provide opportunities for various elements within the Muslim community.
Second, a multi-party system gives an opportunity to groups who feel marginalized to advocate their aspirations openly.
Third, accountability of political parties can guarantee the continuation of democracy and can reinforce society's belief in politics as a channel for advocating their interests and aspirations.
Radical Islam or Islamic groups who continue to promote violence and who coerce others must be processed legally. Their historical relationship with military actors and political interest groups in support of the status quo must be dealt with firmly but proportionally.
The election results in Indonesia prove that Islam is not just compatible with democracy, but that democracy can be as prosperous here as it is in other countries.
The writer is executive director of the Wahid Institute, Jakarta.
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